EU financial safety nets are social contracts that assign uncertain benefits and burdens to taxpayers in different member countries. To help national officials to assess their taxpayers' exposures to loss from partner countries, this paper develops a way to estimate how well markets and regulators in 14 of the EU-15 countries have controlled deposit-institution risk-shifting in recent years. Our method traverses two steps. The first step estimates leverage, return volatility, and safety-net benefits for individual EU financial institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, input data feature 1993-2004 data on stock-market capitalization. Parallel accounting values are used to calculate enterprise value (albeit less precisely) for mutual savings institutions. The second step uses the output from the first step as input into regression models of safety-net benefits and interprets the results. Parameters of the second-step models express differences in the magnitude of safety-net subsidies and in the ability of financial markets and regulators in member countries to restrain the flow of safety-net subsidies to commercial banks and savings institutions. We conclude by showing that banks from high-subsidy and low-restraint countries have initiated and received the lion's share of cross-border M&A activity. The efficiency, stabilization, and distributional effects of allowing banks to and from differently subsidized environments to expand their operations in partner countries pose policy issues that the EU ought to address.
March 25, 2008 EVIDENCE OF DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET MANAGEMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES
In individual countries, banking insolvencies trace to difficulties in constraining the extent and character of risk-taking and risk-shifting by banks. Risk-taking shades into riskshifting when particular bank stakeholders are not adequately compensated for the risks to which they are exposed.
EU directives and Basel agreements divide cross-country accountability for preventing and resolving bank insolvencies in an economically arbitrary way. If a multinational European bank were to fail, the EU's 1994 Directive on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes makes host countries responsible for paying off at least the domestic depositors of any banking offices the failed organization might have operated in their jurisdiction 1 .
Although the host country is charged with supervising banking entities that operate within its borders, Basel arrangements make home-country officials responsible for supervising the accounts of the consolidated multinational organization to which a host-country subsidiary would report. This gives regulators in both countries authority to influence loss exposures and insolvency resolution at host-country banks. Losses large enough to ruin a host-country subsidiary might be dumped on it by a wily offshore parent or a slippery host-country subsidiary might avoid ruin by hiding its losses in assets it manages to transfer to the home country at an inflated value. Unfair though it might be, cross-country differences in bankruptcy procedures and in the effectiveness of market and regulatory discipline exerted in different jurisdictions could force taxpayers of a home or host country to shoulder the bill for negligent acts of safety-net officials, auditors, or creditors in a partner country (Eisenbeis, 2004 and 2006; Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2006) . This paper develops a way for EU regulators to assess their taxpayers' exposures to loss from partner countries. Our method estimates how well, on average, markets and regulators in individual countries manage to control deposit-institution risk-shifting during a specified time period. Sections I and II explain that our procedure combines two steps. We first construct time series for leverage, return volatility, and safety-net benefits at individual EU financial institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, our calculations use 1993-2004 data on stock-market capitalization. In generating these data for mutual institutions, we draw on less frequently
reported accounting values to construct (albeit less precisely) these same three time series.
Section III takes the second step, feeding the first-step estimates as input into regression models of ex ante safety-net benefits and interpreting the results. We show that parameters of the second-step models express differences in the magnitude of safety-net subsidies and in the ability of financial markets and regulators in member countries to restrain the flow of safety-net subsidies to commercial banks and savings institutions. The final section shows that our estimates help to predict cross-border merger activity among banks. It argues that it is poor policy for the EU to allow banks to merge into and out of differently subsidized and differently controlled environments without explicitly considering the efficiency, stabilization, and distributional effects that such mergers might unleash.
I. Risk-Shifting Opportunities Provided by the Safety Nets
It is instructive to conceive of a country's financial safety net as an evolving and purposively incomplete contract whose counterparties are major sectors of that country's economy. This contract has two dimensions. First, it allocates de facto responsibility for controlling bank risk-taking and recapitalizing insolvent institutions to specific regulators and bank stakeholders. Second, to alleviate customer losses in economically and politically arduous circumstances, it authorizes government officials to assign to taxpayers some of the costs of resolving bank insolvencies that supervisory pressure and market discipline fail to prevent.
Financial safety nets expand risk-shifting opportunities by reducing incentives for depositors and other private counterparties to monitor and police risk taking by banks. The costs and benefits a country receives from its safety net depend on how much market discipline the net displaces and how successfully safety-net managers substitute explicit and implicit insurance premiums and takeover threats for the credit-market discipline they displace.
All EU safety nets include depositor guarantees. By exerting lobbying pressure, a country's banking industry can and (we find) do keep these guarantees from being fully priced.
The result is that an increase in a bank's overall risk exposure can almost always increase the value of the safety-net benefits it receives. This creates an incentive to search out and to exploit weaknesses in risk-control arrangements. At the same time, takeover threats exerted by safetynet managers make it uneconomic to maximize the value of current-period benefits. The result is that bankers support their risk-taking partly -but only partly -with off-balance sheet risk capital that they extract strategically via the safety net from taxpayers and less-adventurous banks (Kane, 1995; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2002) .
Merton (1974) models the equity of a firm as a call option on the firm's assets whose exercise price is the book value of creditor claims (B). When B exceeds the value of bank assets, creditors absorb the difference. Safety-net support allows creditors to put some or all of their losses to safety-net managers. This reduces the net default risk that markets for equity and debt must price (Vassalou and Xing, 2004) .
The per-period flow of safety-net benefits that bank stockholders enjoy can be defined as a "fair" insurance premium (IPP) expressed per euro of a bank's deposits. Merton (1977 Merton ( , 1978 shows that the IPP increases both with a bank's leverage and with the volatility of its returns. In
Merton's one-period model, leverage is measured as the ratio of the market value (D) of deposits and other debt to the market value of a bank's assets (V). Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the return on bank assets (σ V ). Our first-round estimates replace D with its book value (B) and our second-round models parsimoniously linearize the IPP as:
This formulation implies that, other things equal, the value of safety-net benefits increases in both σ V and B/V. By themselves, the positive partial derivatives
in (1) tell us how much incremental value bank stockholders might extract from the safety net by increasing the associated form of risk-taking.
The benchmark single-equation model (1) does not explicitly recognize that debt and deposit-insurance contracts convey covenant-like monitoring and loss-control powers to creditors and safety-net managers that empower them to restrain risk-shifting directly (Kane, 1995) . To analyze the risk-shifting process at individual countries and banks, we estimate a version of the two-equation model pioneered by Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) . To address whether and how well safety-net covenants constrain bank-risk-shifting incentives, Duan et al. introduce into the Merton model a structural equation for the debt-to-asset ratio, B/V:
Equation (2) is a locus of potential market-equilibrium points that expresses a tradeoff between the pursuit of current safety-net benefits and the bank's exposure to takeover by creditors or insurers. Substituting (2) into (1) produces the following (partially) reduced-form equation:
where ε 3 =ε 1 + γ 2 ε 2 . Even though it is convenient to estimate (2) and (3) separately, an underlying recursive structure links the two equations:
In portraying volatility as an exogenous variable, the model assumes that V σ represents a value-maximizing decision made in response to a vector of unobserved bank-specific profit generators. The underlying intuition is that of a dynamic rational-expectations game: each bank sets its leverage and asset volatility jointly, with the understanding that creditors and safety-net managers monitor these values and restrain leverage by raising funding costs and standing ready to take over the franchise in the event of insolvency. In turn, creditors and regulators expect banks to react ex ante and ex post to the discipline they provide. Equation (2) expresses the hypothesis that, in equilibrium, outside monitoring constrains banks to choose points that lie on a locus of mutually acceptable leverage and volatility pairs.
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the sign of β 1 in equations (3) and (5) indicates whether a bank's covenanted contracting environment allows increases in asset volatility to increase the multiperiod value of its safety-net guarantees. In principle, the total derivative β 1 incorporates the value of the opportunity to operate the bank in future periods (Ritchken, Thomson, and DeGennaro, 1993) . If β 1 is nonpositive, risk-shifting incentives in a given country are fully neutralized.
To constrain risk-taking at all, outside limitations on leverage must be risk-sensitive enough to overcome the "inside" value of leverage to bank stockholders so as to establish a negatively sloped locus of acceptable B/V and σ V values. However, a negative α 1 only implies that risk-sensitive capital regulation and complementary takeover and market discipline partially constrain realizable safety-net benefits. As an input into β 1 in equation (5), the size of α 1 tells us whether at the margin outside discipline is potent enough to persuade the bank not to increase return volatility when outside capital requirements increase. To neutralize risk-shifting incentives at the margin, outside pressure must induce a decline in B/V large enough to offset the currentperiod increase in IPP a higher σ V would otherwise generate.
Thus, for market and regulatory pressure consistently to discipline --and potentially to neutralize --incremental risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met:
Capital must increase with volatility:
Guarantee value must not rise with volatility:
Although the values of assets, guarantees, and volatility are imbedded in a bank's stock price, none of these variables is directly observable. However, Marcus and Shaked (1984) show that we can use option-based numerical expressions for the value of deposit insurance to track these variables synthetically. Because finance theory tends to focus on unobservable values, running regressions on synthetic data sets is a common practice in finance. This two-step approach tests substantive hypotheses about asset valuation jointly with the subsidiary hypothesis that the synthetic observations are reliable estimates of the true variables.
Every model makes deliberate and hard-to-defend simplifications. In interpreting our parsimonious regression experiments, we cannot rule out the possibility that omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneous-equation bias distort the outcomes in unknown ways. Murphy and Topel (1985) show that standard errors of substantive parameters are often underestimated in two-step tests. These considerations suggest that we should interpret t-values conservatively and subject our results to robustness checks.
The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure is to generate tracking values for V and σ V by numerical methods. These values are then used to estimate IPP as the value of a put option on bank assets. The procedure begins by solving the call-option formula for equity, E.
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The last step uses Îto's lemma to link σ V to E, V and σ E (the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns) by means of equation (6):
The procedure follows Merton (1977) in portraying deposit insurance as a single-period European put option on the bank's assets. Merton treats bank equity as the sum of a dividendunprotected European call option and the present value of the dividends distributed before the option's expiration date. The bank's debt is assumed to mature in one year, which is also the assumed exercise date for the insurer. The model expresses the value of a bank's equity, E, and the value of the fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, as:
In (7) and (8), δ is the fraction of bank assets distributed at each interim dividend date to stockholders, T is the number of interim dividend payments, N(x i ) states the probability that the variate value x is ≤ x i , given that x is distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
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Ronn and Verma (1986) adapt Merton's model to account for the likelihood that safetynet managers would forbear from exercising their right to call the put when their claim is only slightly in the money. When forbearance occurs, the value of the short position in the put can turn negative. The RV model scales down the effective exercise price of the put for all banks and all dates by a factor of ρ = 0.97. The data we employ to estimate equations (2) and (3) set T equal to one year:
Although we will experiment with other specifications eventually, for fixed samples, the policy implications of regression experiments using U.S. data have proven relatively insensitive to variation in ρ
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. Moreover, Pennacchi (1987a and b) shows that, by counterfactually presuming prompt and complete insolvency resolution, single-period models of IPP tend to understate the economic value that government guarantees convey to bank stockholders. In exploring differences in risk-shifting opportunities and authorities' ability to constrain them, this bias increases the power of regression tests based on a minimal-forbearance model.
II. Input Data
Tables 1 through 3 summarize the synthetic datasets on IPP, B/V, and σ V over which we conduct regression experiments. Our goal is to compare the quality of safety-net management not
Of course, parameter estimates are sensitive to differences in the years and countries covered in any experiment.
only across countries, but also between commercial banks and savings institutions in each country.
Because commercial banks are stockholder-owned, regression inputs can be calculated from data on bank stock prices recorded on Bankscope. However, savings banks and credit cooperative banks are mutual institutions. This has three important consequences. First, values for E, B/V and σ V must be calculated entirely from book values. Given that balance-sheet data are reported less frequently than stock prices, variation in returns is bound to be understated for mutual institutions. Second, at mutuals, risk-taking incentives are blunted because owners and managers cannot divide potential gains from risk-shifting by writing easily enforceable side contracts. Third, mutual institutions do not pay dividends. Assuming that market-determined interest rates are paid on loans and deposits, we treat the reported value of "distributed profits" (contributions to social works and social funds) as a rough counterpart. In interpreting statistical tests, we must recognize that the reliability of coefficient estimates in IPP equations for mutuals is weakened by these difficulties. The Appendix shows the main sources of information employed to estimate IPP, B/V, and σ V values separately for commercial banks and for savings and cooperative banks. To provide proxies for market-value data for mutual institutions, we experiment with two alternatives: the first employs book values for E, B/V, and σ V ; the second generates synthetic market-value data by using the model and parameters estimated for commercial banks. Our procedures are summarized in the Appendix. Table 1 shows the size of sample cells for both types of institutions in each of the EU-15 countries. For all but four countries (Austria, Sweden, Italy, and Germany) the number of observations for commercial banks exceeds that for mutual institutions. For several countries, data on mutual institutions are scant and may not be fully representative of overall industry experience. Gaps in data availability persuade us to delete Greece from the study and limitations on sample size lower the power of statistical tests for comparisons involving a few other countries. Table 2 For mutual institutions, Table 3 reports safety-net premiums and return volatility in two ways. Model I applies the RV procedure directly to the accounting values these firms report.
Model II instead runs the accounting data for mutuals through the equations used to generate IPP and σ V for each country's commercial banks. In most cases, the second procedure greatly lowers the values of safety-net benefits and volatility at mutual firms. One might interpret this as evidence that, on average in most EU countries, more outside discipline is exerted on commercial banks than on savings institutions.
III. Regression Results
However high or low the mean value of safety-net benefits might be in a given country, the policy problem is to control risk-shifting at the margin. In effect, managers of risky banks engage regulators and creditors in an endless dynamic game. As creditors and regulators develop ways to counter a bank's ability to burden them, bankers devise new strategies for concealing or understating their exposure to loss. The dialectical nature of this game makes it advisable to estimate equation (2) and (3) For commercial banks, α 1 is significantly negative at better than one percent, except in Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy. In the ten other countries, capital discipline significantly restrains risk. However, β 1 still proves positive for all countries, ranging from 0.001 in Austria and in France to 0.045 in Sweden. At one-percent significance, only for Austria, Finland and France can we reject the hypothesis that safety-net subsidies exist. Incremental safety-net control is weakest in Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, and Denmark.
With the exception of Sweden, the values of α 1 and β 1 found for mutual institutions in Table 5 using Model I do not differ much from those reported for banks in Table 4 . When Model II is used to adjust accounting data, α 1 typically becomes more negative, but β 1 usually becomes more positive. However, when we use accounting data to fit the model to commercial banks, results do not differ significantly from those reported in Table 4 . This suggests that, by itself, disciplining accounting capital might prove a more reliable way to control risk-shifting at commercial banks than at savings institutions.
Still, judging by our baseline Model I estimates, it appears that capital discipline importantly influences risk-taking at savings institutions. Except in Netherlands and Italy, α 1 proves significantly negative at one percent, but at that level of significance, the hypothesis of incremental safety-net subsidies (i.e., positive β 1 ) is rejected only for Finland and France. The good news is that the magnitude of estimated safety-net benefits at savings institutions is relatively small, exceeding 7 basis points only for Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy.
Partitioning Countries by IPP and β 1 Values. Our policy focus is how the costs of resolving financial-institution distress might seep unrecognized across borders. Figure 1 divides the 14 counties into three classes based on observable clusters in the mean value of their IPP for banks.
Countries whose IPP is 15 basis points or less are coded as "low." Countries whose IPP are 20 basis points or higher are coded as "high" IPP. The other five countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden) are coded as "medium."
The policy issue is whether adverse economic shocks could force taxpayers and regulators in low-β 1 countries to pay for weaknesses in market and regulatory oversight exerted on institutions by high-β 1 countries. To explore this issue, in Figure 2 we use the β 1 estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 to partition the commercial-bank and savings-bank samples into three clusters: β 1 ≤ .05; .05 < β 1 < .012; β 1 ≥ .012.
Both for banks and for supervisory officials, incentives for risk-shifting intensify as an institution slides into financial distress (Marcus, 1984; Kane, 1989) . To protect taxpayers in home and host countries, markets and officials in high-β 1 countries must have the authority to subject troubled banks to significantly stronger disciplines. To investigate this question, we experiment with two dummy variables. What we call the "low-capital dummy" equals 1 for institutions that fall in the less capitalized (i.e., more levered) half of the aggregate sample in the preceding period and equals zero otherwise. As a robustness check, we employ an alternative "high-premium dummy" that equals one for institutions whose fair premium exceeded the median value recorded in the previous period.
In Tables 6 and 7 , each dummy is interacted with ∆σ V . In the columns reporting on these experiments, the total effect of ∆σ V on the leverage ratio and fair premium is the sum of the two coefficients shown.
Very different pictures emerge for banks and for savings institutions. In the IPP equations for banks in the higher-β 1 subsamples, the value of access to safety-net subsidies falls for distressed banks and the decline is significant in three of the four cells. On the other hand, in the IPP equations for savings institutions, discipline strengthens for troubled institutions (though only at 5 percent significance) in low-β 1 countries, but falls sharply in high-β 1 jurisdictions. This is true even though leverage restrictions tighten significantly when distress emerges.
These results support the hypothesis that, in EU countries, it has been difficult for commercial banks and easy for savings institutions to expand their access to safety-net subsidies when they fall into distress. Still, because few savings institutions are large enough to command too-big-to-fail benefits or to engage in substantial cross-border activity, their risk-shifting capacity seems unlikely to create important loss exposures for regulators and taxpayers in partner countries. The greater concern should attach to large commercial banks operating in home or host countries whose safety-net management is not yet up to speed.
Evidence of Learning by Doing. Table 8 reports on the age of individual-country depositinsurance schemes. Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven (2003) find that in the early years of operating a deposit-insurance system, officials are apt to do a poor job of replacing the depositor discipline they displace. Tables 9 and 10 investigate this issue for our EU-14, partitioned by the effectiveness of safety-net management.
Both for commercial banks and for savings institutions, the tables indicate that countries whose safety-net management is highly effective established tight control from the outset. The statistical significance of the system's age in the other two subsamples indicates that safety-net managers in other countries did tend to improve their control as their systems aged.
IV. Robustness Issues
Potentially observable sources of variation might explain at least some cross-country differences. This section investigates four possibilities.
Effects from Differences in Character of Deposit-Insurance Coverage and Management.
Tables 11 and 12 depict several ways that deposit-insurance schemes in the EU-15 differ in structure. Although one might suppose that differences in the design features imbedded in different deposit-insurance schemes could explain the bulk of cross-country differences in loss control, quick inspection suggests that this hypothesis can be rejected. Narrow coverage does not translate directly into either low β 1 or low IPP. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden cover the fewest categories of deposit, but our regressions classify none of them as a low-IPP country and only one of them (Finland) as a low-β 1 country.
As a formal test of whether and how loss control is affected by the extent of differences in deposit insurance design, we can use principal components analysis. Table 13 lists indicator variables for 16 differences in deposit insurance design. For commercial banks and savings institutions separately, we regress each country's mean IPP, σ V , α 1 , and β 1 on the value of the first three principal components of these 16 variables for that country. Except that the first component is assigned small negative loadings (.11 or less) to DM 7, 9, 10 and 12, all loadings prove positive. Three-quarters of the 24 regression coefficients are negative, but no coefficient was significant at five percent. The estimated impact of the three principal components on IPP, σ V , α 1 , and β 1 was found to be less than 0.1% in absolute terms in all cases.
We also ran tests using individual indicators. Slope coefficients differ negligibly and insignificantly between countries whose schemes do and do not cover deposits that are denominated in foreign currencies or held by very large companies. Eurostat. Covariance tests find no differences in capital discipline by country size. The lowest p-value is 0.17 for differences in slopes between the medium and lowest GDP size classes.
However, safety-net subsidies are higher in the smallest countries and the differences prove significant for all pairs by covariance tests. The p-values range between 0.01 and 0.03 and indicate that undesirable distributional effects are more intense in smaller countries. This may be because their governments lack the capacity either to finance or to execute preventive supervision as effectively.
Effects from Government
Ownership. The risk-shifting process passes losses directly to taxpayers in state-owned institutions. This leads us to investigate whether incentives at publiclyowned banks might differ from those at private institutions. Banks are defined as publicly-owned if a public (national, regional or local) authority holds at least 50 percent of its capital. The differences are shown in Table 16 . Safety-net subsidies do prove significantly lower for public banks, but only at the 2-percent level. However, the data reject the hypothesis that capital discipline varies between privately-owned and publicly-owned banks (the p-value for the covariance test is 0.22).
Effects from Special Governmental Support of Major Banks. Since differences across EU
countries in risk-shifting incentives are more likely to affect multinational banks, we compare risk-shifting behavior at country-champion banks with that for other sample banks. Countrychampion banks are defined as those whose total assets fall in the first size decile of EU banks.
These banks are listed in the Appendix. Table 17 shows that country-champion banks do extract higher incremental safety-net benefits. The p-value of the relevant covariance test is 0.01. At the same time, α 1 estimates show that country-champion banks receive stronger capital discipline on average and this difference proves statistically significant at 2 percent.
V. Policy implications for EU Merger Policies
Contestability theories of market structure stress the importance of entry and exit costs.
Incentives exist for national governments to protect domestic institutions from entry by foreign competitors and to resist the exit of important domestic enterprises by bailing them out when they become insolvent. The strength and predictability of these incentives let bank stakeholders estimate fair insurance premiums for commercial banks and savings institutions in each country.
In countries like the Netherlands where three large institutions dominate banking markets and foreign competition was until recently discouraged, too-big-to-fail benefits can be substantial.
Although the mean value of the safety-net benefits reported in Tables 2 and 3 range only between 13 and 32 basis points, these estimates are biased downward by using a model that assumes counterfactually that safety-net enhancements do not increase in difficult times and expire after only one year. Although our findings are subject to simultaneous-equations bias from treating changes in volatility as exogenous, our estimates of the rate at which benefits respond to increments in volatility (β 1 ) avoid early-expiration bias. The magnitude of this coefficient ranges from 10 to 450 basis points for commercial banks and from 40 to 760 basis points for savings institutions.
Some high-β 1 countries (e.g., Sweden) have suffered sectoral crises, but several (e.g., Netherlands) have not. In any case, it is particularly dangerous for the EU either to permit banks such as Nordea to move their headquarters from low-β 1 to high-β 1 locales or to allow banks from high-IPP and high-β 1 countries to exploit the single-license framework to expand their footings in low-β 1 countries.
Consistent with the hypothesis of cross-country risk-shifting by commercial banks, Table   18 indicates that capital and IPP discipline is less effective at offshore subsidiary banks than at parent institutions and that multinational organizations experience significantly less aggregate restraint from both home and host regulators than purely domestic banks do. Cross-border acquisitions by value-maximizing banks from high-IPP and high β 1 environments can expand their access to safety-net subsidies from home-country taxpayers. Banks from environments in which IPP and β 1 are low may be able to extract subsidies from taxpayers in high-IPP and high-β 1 hosts. As these opportunties imply, Table 19 shows that, vis-à-vis estimated safety-net benefits, acquisition activity moves both uphill and downhill. Banks from high-IPP and high-β 1 countries have both initiated and received the lion's share of cross-border merger and acquisition activity. From a global perspective, entry of banks from or into high-premium or low-control home countries can produce wasteful patterns of real investment, threaten the stability of home and host banking systems, and place heavy burdens on unwary taxpayers. Sooner or later, EU authorities will have to confront the coordination challenges that these effects raise. -E, the market value of a bank's equity: computed as the end-of-period stock-market capitalization.
-σ E , standard deviation of the return on equity: computed as the standard deviation of: (1) deleveraged quarterly holding-period returns on stock for commercial banks and (2) reported quarterly return on equity reported by mutual institutions.
-δ, fraction of bank assets distributed yearly as dividends to stockholders.
These variables are taken directly from the Bankscope database, provided by Bureau Van Dijk.
Since a market value for equity cannot be observed for (non-quoted) savings & cooperative banks, we experiment for these institutions with two different models of IPP, B/V and σ V values.
-Model I: This is our baseline model. It employs market or market-like values wherever possible. Since savings and cooperative banks do not pay dividends, we represent "distributed profits" as a "social dividend" that is intended to capture community claims that are exerted on these institutions. The "social dividend" consists primarily of contributions to social works and social funds. Germany that we will call SB i :
Step 1: Fitted model for the average commercial bank in Germany in 2000: Step 2: Fitted model for SB i in 2000:
The σ E , (∂E/∂V), δ, Τ and ρ parameters and the probabilities for normal densities estimated for commercial banks are used to compute "market" values of σ V and V for savings bank SB i : 
TABLE 4 SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V . B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. 
TABLE 5 SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS
AT SAVINGS AND COOPERATIVE BANKS Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, (∆B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the changes in the riskiness of its assets, ∆σ V . B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns report the value of α 1 and β 1 , respectively. 
Model I Model II Austria
∆(B/V) ∆IPP ∆(B/V) ∆IPP ∆σ V -0
TABLE 14 ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, MIXED, JOINT-LIABILITY AND SEPARATE-LIABILITY SCHEMES
Public deposit guarantee scheme
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆(B/V) ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆IPP ∆σ V -0
TABLE 16 RISK-SHIFTING AT PUBLICLY-OWNED VS. PRIVATELY-OWNED BANKS
Panel data fixed-effects regressions relating changes in a bank's leverage, ∆(B/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ∆IPP, to the changes in the riskiness of their assets, ∆σ V . B is the face value of bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank's assets. 
Publicly-owned

TABLE 17 RISK-SHIFTING AT COUNTRY CHAMPION BANKS VS. ALL OTHER BANKS
Country champion banks
TABLE 18 ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FOURTEEN EU COUNTRIES: FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES, PARENT BANKS AND PURELY DOMESTIC BANKS
